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Dissecting the Attitudes of Political
Science Students Towards Democracy
and the 2004 Elections in Indonesia
Adam Tyson and Paul Tyson
Students’ attitudes towards Indonesia’s transition from an authoritarian era to
democracy varied from strong support for the democratic transition to nostalgia for
the authoritarian era’s strong leadership and economic prosperity. A sample of 317
students from three Indonesian universities was asked to rate the importance of political,
economic, legal and social democratic principles. In addition to concerns about
corruption, economic decline and security, students differed significantly centring on
the importance of legitimate elections, representation, tolerance, accountability, human
rights and gender equality. The majority of students were pessimistic about the elections;
paradoxically some students optimistic about the general elections rated democratic
principles the least important. After discussing the implications, political attitudes about
democracy and elections were related to cognitive consistency and dissonance theory.
Keywords: Democracy; Elections; Authoritarian; Corruption; Cognitive Dissonance
Introduction
Mainstream political literature has produced a comprehensive set of characteristics
and norms defining democracy and associated processes, culminating in landmark
works on the democratic audit and international framework for democratic
assessment (Weir and Beetham, 1999). Drawing on the fundamental principles put
forth in such works, attitude scales measuring public support for democracy are
being applied in the context of nations in transition, the so-called emerging
democracies of the developing world (Huntington, 1991). With specific regards to
Indonesia, the recent political reform movement has enthusiastically adopted the
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language of democracy, as can be seen in the university curriculum, the discourse
among activists, NGOs, government, and the mainstream media. The future of
democracy in the world’s largest Muslim country belongs to the attitudes of the
youth, particularly their interpretation of political history, role of elections, and
importance of democratic values in shaping contemporary Indonesian. This article
will focus on how different interpretations of the transition from three decades of
authoritarian rule under President Suharto to democracy in 1998 affect political
science students’ concerns about the 2004 national elections, and the degree of
importance they attach to specific democratic principles.
Brief Political History
Independence for Indonesia in 1945, after three and a half centuries of Dutch colonial
presence, found nationalist leaders faced with a largely illiterate population with
limited bureaucratic or commercial experience and divided along ethnic and cultural
lines (Ricklefs, 2001). Mobilizing a population in the world’s largest archipelago
towards a sense of national identity compatible with democracy was instilled by
nationalist slogans such as ‘bhinneka tunggal ika’ or unity in diversity, and Pancasila
ingraining five central principles: belief in God, humanitarianism, nationalism,
democracy and social justice (Ramage, 1995). The uneasy political coalition forged by
Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president, was threatened as competing social forces,
corruption, and capitalistic exploitation weakened public support for democracy.
With little post-war economic recovery and incarceration of much of the opposition
leadership, President Sukarno abrogated the constitution, appointed the legislature,
and ended liberal democracy (von der Mehden, 2005).1 By 1965 the delicate
balancing act had unravelled and the leadership of Sukarno was undermined
following an attempted coup and a national crisis. As Sukarno faced house arrest the
country was plunged into violence as the anticommunist purges intensified,2 leaving
a gap which was quickly filled by General Suharto (Emmerson, 2004). Formal
recognition of Suharto’s presidency came in 1966 and for the next 32 years his rule
was consolidated in what came to be known as the New Order era.
The New Order era was characterized by authoritarian rule, relative stability and
economic growth, leading many Indonesians to look back sympathetically at this
period of history. During these decades of strong leadership, modernization based on
foreign investment spurred export revenues, per capita income rose, poverty declined,
transportation improved along with communications, television and life expectancy
(von der Mehden, 2005). Despite economic and social growth, problems with
corruption were epidemic, elections were not free or representative, political
accountability was low, and the military was an agent to enforce social policy. In
spite of these problems, there still exists a degree of nostalgia for the New Order in
Indonesia due to its perceived political and economic stability, as well as security
from communal violence, terrorism and lawlessness (Emmerson, 2004).

































































The transition in 1998 which was precipitated by the Asian financial crisis saw the
Suharto regime collapse, giving way to the ‘Era Reformasi’ (reform era) which in turn
led to open elections in 1999.3 Amongst the many trigger effects leading to this
transition were persistent student protests held throughout the archipelago, most
heavily concentrated in the capital Jakarta. Vocal and often dramatic student
protestors paralysed traffic along the central thoroughfares of Jakarta, and university
campuses were transformed into forums of non-violent activism where student
leaders demanded radical reforms.4 The Trisakti campus shootings resulting in the
death of four students on 12 May 1998 only served to solidify the opposition to
Suharto’s military backed regime (Webber, 2006). Just nine days later, on 21 May
1998, Suharto formalized his resignation and public expectations began to run
dangerously high as the era of democratization was ushered in (McRae, 1999).
On 7 June 1999 the Republic of Indonesia held its first free elections for the
national legislature since 1955, but it resulted in political fragmentation as elected
members divided into six major parties and 17 minor parties (Carter Center, 1999).
Since no party had a majority, the indirect determination of Indonesia’s president led
to factional infighting and uncertainty. This was temporarily resolved through
political manoeuvring at the elite level, and compromises were reached with members
of the security apparatus as well as with Islamic parties, eventually bringing
Abdurrahman Wahid to power. He had been a proponent of liberal democracy
and religious tolerance, but within two years Wahid was forced to resign due to
claims of ill health as well as impeachment charges (von der Mehden, 2005). A special
session held by the National Assembly on 23 July 2001 formalized the removal of
Wahid, paving the way for the presidency of President Megawati Sukarnoputri,
daughter of Indonesia’s first president Sukarno. Her strengths were neither in
parliamentary skills nor policy initiatives, but her cautious approach enabled her to
stay in power and Megawati soon became a symbol of opposition to the legacy of
Suharto’s New Order (Thalang, 2005).
In spite of this, by 2003 surveys conducted by the Indonesian Survey Institute
found that most voters judged the New Order system to have been better than the
presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri (Qodari, 2005). Faculty from Gajah Mada
University in Central Java reinforced the findings of this survey by stating that their
students may be suffering from ‘collective amnesia’ given the long struggle of their
predecessors to have Suharto removed from power.5 The pre-transition nostalgia for
the predictability and relative security of life under President Suharto became known
as ‘SARS’ (‘Sendrom Amat Rindu Suharto’ or ‘longing for Suharto syndrome’) after
the well-known epidemic disease (Qodari, 2005: 80).
In a climate of rising public dissatisfaction, the next substantive test for the
reformasi period was the 2004 direct presidential election. Round one of the elections
were held on 5 July, while the second and decisive round was held on 20 September.
Hoping to capitalize on growing public discontent, Suharto’s eldest daughter, Siti
Hardiyanti Rukmana (popularly known as Tutut), and former army chief of staff
General Hartono, formed a new political party called the PKPB. Having been a

































































minister in her father’s cabinet, Tutut wanted to capture the 2004 elections in order to
restore the family’s reputation and defend the New Order regime, although she never
seriously challenged the other candidates (Webber, 2006). As discussed later, the
unexpected partnership of candidates Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Yusuf Kalla
triumphed in the end.
Amongst the various issues that arose during this time, this article will dissect how
democratic principles are linked to different attitudes towards the New Order and
importance of leadership in national elections. Those sympathetic with the New
Order assert that strong and effective leadership was an advantage of authoritarian
rule even though it historically sacrificed democratic principles and fair elections.
Strong leadership is meant to translate into decisive governance, though for it to be
compatible with democracy it must be coupled with accountability, transparency,
participation, representation, as well as self-imposed limitations in order to avoid the
excesses of corruption or maladministration.
In terms of ensuring that contemporary elections are both free and fair, the General
Elections Commission (Komisis Pemilihan Umum*KPU) has been entrusted with
organizing, supervising, monitoring and overseeing all aspects of elections in
Indonesia (Emmerson, 2004). As part of election reforms, an international presence
consisting of independent monitoring commissions including academics and NGOs
appointed by parliament, rather than government and party representatives, was
designed to limit factors such as electoral manipulation, money politics and fraud.
Despite such innovations, many contentious issues remain.
Contentious Electoral Issues in the Post-Transition Era
Advocates of democratization in Indonesia were quickly alerted to the possibility that
Indonesia’s newly reformed political system would fail to produce strong and effective
leaders capable of consolidating their rule. Failure to address the country’s multitude
of problems, such as the need for unity in times of increasing separatism, would
further undermine public confidence (Emmerson, 2004). The ongoing project of
nation-building in Indonesia has been hindered by the diversity of the country,
reflected in the emerging party system where a multitude of political parties are
rooted in a variety of traditions, ideologies and beliefs, with potentially negative
effects on forging national unity and democratic stability. Political exploitation of
tensions between such groups tends to polarize the multiparty system, jeopardizing
leadership coalitions and policy-related collaborations. Leaders often appear
indecisive and overly cautious when faced with political opposition and lobbying
from all directions, resulting in a tendency to seek out compromise while maintaining
the status quo and slowing reform. Widespread disillusionment with post-Suharto
leadership has been exacerbated by perceptions of ineffective economic reforms,
rising levels of unemployment, and inept anti-corruption campaigns (Tan, 2002).
Political jockeying and divisions within the 48 registered political parties seemed to
influence the selection of President Wahid by the legislature in 1999, eventually

































































leading to constitutional reforms and the direct presidential elections of 2004
(Qodari, 2005). Five sets of presidential and vice-presidential candidates were on the
ballot in 2004, and if no pair managed to win 50% or more of the vote, there would
be a runoff between the top two finishers. Many political scientists predicted that
because this was the first direct presidential election held in Indonesia, it would result
in factionalism, instability and policy-making paralysis in a multiparty parliament. In
some ways this has been the case; however, since the direct elections of 2004 there
have also been successes and the administration has proven capable of breaking the
deadlock and undertaking difficult reforms that have been unpopular with the
general public, such as the reduction of fuel subsidies in October 2005.6
Another contentious issue from the 2004 general elections was the degree to which
elections were considered to be free and fair. Beginning with the positives, it appears
that democratic reforms have reduced the political and social functions of the
military and police, preventing them from selecting some of the members of the
house, increased the accountability of legislators to their constituents, and ensuring
that monitors of the 2004 elections would consist of members who did not have
conflicts of interest (Qodari, 2005). With a complex series of three elections, the
democratic system was tested like never before, with a roster of 148 million eligible
voters choosing from 450,000 legislative candidates, competing for 16,000 legislative
seats covering more than 12,000 islands spread across 10 million square kilometres.
Just as in 1999, there was the prospect of rioting, provocation, and conflict between
rival ethnic minorities and religious groups represented by 24 parties running for
legislative seats which fortunately never materialized (Qodari, 2005). President
Suharto during the New Order era only allowed three political parties, including his
own Golkar Party, which has enjoyed continued support as illustrated by its capture
of 22.4% of the popular vote after Suharto’s removal from office and despite
accusations of corruption, arrests of party members, instigations of violence, and
Golkar’s close association with the widely criticized military apparatus (Collins,
2002). Five years later, the well organized and deeply rooted Golkar Party still has
considerable popular support within Indonesia’s multiparty system. The party leader
Jusuf Kalla, hailing from Sulawesi, is now Vice President and enjoys significant
support in Eastern Indonesia. However, whether or not the continued influence of
the Golkar Party translates into a threat to the democratization process has yet to be
demonstrated.
Political Psychology
Political surveys measuring people’s attitudes, beliefs and behaviours usually find an
underlying cognitive consistency because they are derived from a coherent system of
rational and emotional values. For example, Eysenck (1954), using a liberal
conservative scale, found those people who displayed strong liberal or conservative
attitudes in one area will also tend to express a similar attitude in most of the other
fields tested and were resistant to attitude change by political advertising,

































































propaganda, or other means. In this context, Indonesians who were positive about
the transition from the New Order era to democracy would also tend to be optimistic
about the 2004 elections. Furthermore, those who were negative about the political
transition after President Suharto’s downfall in 1998 would have similar pessimistic
feelings about the 2004 democratic elections.
Modern theories have introduced a dual-process model of political reasoning
where questions about beliefs are first quickly evaluated in terms of affect and the
extent to which past experience can easily generate a coherent response (Lodge and
Taber, 2005). Only when this relatively automatic process fails does the individual
think about their response to the question, taking a fairly time consuming process of
retrieving information from memory, considering alternatives, and deliberating the
logical consequences. However, it could be argued that this automatic process occurs
predominately in people who are not interested in political issues or rigidly hold to a
doctrine based on faith (Jost and Hunyady, 2002).
Political sophistication is the process of gaining and ultimately possessing expertise
in one or more domains of political thinking and it should lead to more rational
weighting of information before making a decision (Lieberman et al., 2001). Scholars
in the field of politics tend to evaluate the congruency of the question with past
experience and attitudes, taking more time to answer questions which presumably
reflects more depth of processing. Empirical research has shown that people’s prior
political attitudes are quite resistant to change, especially among those who hold
strong attitudes and they will actively bolster their position with counterarguments,
scepticism, and rationalizations (Lodge and Taber, 2005). Incongruent information
has been hypothesized to cause the person to feel uncomfortable and motivate them
to change their attitudes, or re-evaluate their importance, or avoid the conflicting
information using a variety of defence mechanisms.
Festinger (1957) elucidated his cognitive dissonance theory and posits that when a
person’s attitudes or beliefs are discrepant, physiological arousal results, leading to
motivate the person to restore harmony. Once noticed, the discomfort is attributed to
the discrepancy between the conflicting ideas and pressure mounts to reduce
dissonance depending on their importance to the individual. In emerging
democracies, attitude measures of democracy tend to be different than established
democracies since opinions are expressed in light of direct experience with the old
regime and its comparative performance.
The conceptual framework people have in mind for democracy will have common
features in all democracies, but these features will be given very different levels of
importance in different countries. For example, citizens in post-communistic
countries may consider civil liberties and human rights very important, while in
Asia or Latin America, legitimate elections and anti-corruption may be considered of
greatest importance (Lagos, 2003). Nostalgia for Suharto’s authoritarian era may
conflict with liberal democracy and could produce dissonance to the degree that
individuals value specific democratic principles.


































































Hypothesis 1: Negative and Positive Developments (Table 1)
Indonesian political science students, listing the negative developments that have
occurred since the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, will focus on
economic decline, corruption and political instability. Students listing the positive
developments since Indonesia’s political transition to democracy will concentrate on
civil liberties, electoral and political reforms. A questionnaire was used to measure the
opinions of university students concerning this transitional point in Indonesian
history using open- and closed-ended questions.
Hypothesis 2: Transition from Authoritarian Era to Democracy (Table 2)
Indonesian students studying politics with positive attitudes towards the political
transition in 1998, ending more than three decades of rule under Suharto, will rate
democratic principles as more important than individuals who are negative about the
transition. Balanced for positive and negative affect, one question dealt with
developments since the political transition in 1998 and a second question dealt
with a comparison of the New Order and reform era.
Hypothesis 3: Indonesia’s Reformed 2004 Electoral Process (Table 3)
Optimistic students who felt that pro-democratic reforms would result in free and
fair elections as well as strong and effective leadership will rate democratic principles
as more important than those respondents who were pessimistic towards the 2004
general elections. One survey question measured the optimism of politics students
towards electing strong and effective leaders and another question dealt with whether
they were optimistic that the elections would be free and fair.
Hypothesis 4: Cognitive Consistency between Transition and Elections (Table 4)
Indonesian students who were positive towards the transition from the authoritarian
era to democracy and optimistic towards the elections will rate democratic principles
more important than students negative about the transition and pessimistic towards
the 2004 general elections.
Hypothesis 5: Cognitive Dissonance between Transition and Elections (Tables 5 and 6)
Ambivalent students who were positive towards the democratic transition but
pessimistic about the elections will rate democratic principles as more important
than respondents who were negative about the transition but optimistic towards the
2004 general elections. In addition, the latter political science students who
historically were negative about the transition to democracy and presently positive

































































about the 2004 elections will resolve the conflict by undervaluing the importance of
democratic principles more than respondents consistently negative about democracy
and the elections.
Sample
The 317 participants in this study were surveyed between February and April before
the 2004 elections in July and September. They were political science and
international relations students with a convenience sample of at least 100 students
from three universities in Java, Indonesia’s most populous island.7 The female
(57.1%) and male (42.3%) students ranged in age from 17 to 26 years (M20.32,
SD1.36). When given the option of reporting religion 51.4% were Islamic, 27.8%
Christian, 0.9% Hindu, 0.9% Buddhist, and 18.9% gave no answer that was coded as
no response (nr). Although 76.3% (2.5% nr) of the students were not interested in
joining a political party, 43.2% (2.8% nr) wanted to work for the government in the
future and 72.9% (3.5% nr) would rather work for the non-governmental sector to
make political changes in Indonesia.
Results
Examination of Negative and Positive Developments (Hypothesis 1)
Political transitions are highly contentious events, and there is no clear consensus
among scholars about the necessary preconditions or the salience of factors which
trigger such transitions. For instance, one may question whether a specific level of
economic development or political consciousness has to be achieved before a
sustainable transition can take place. In the case of Indonesia, there were decades of
economic growth under an authoritarian system which gave rise to an emerging
middle class, after which economic crisis and civil unrest precipitated the transition
towards democracy. Scholars tend to assert that strong majorities consisting of a vocal
middle class should support democracy, allowing the transition to take root and
eventually be consolidated, although this is not always the case (Linz and Stepan,
1996).
In this study, 93.7% (1.6% nr) of students surveyed supported the democratic
movement in Indonesia, whereas the negative respondents (0.6% nr) preferred some
form of authoritarianism (1.9%), socialist democracy (1.6%) or liberal Islam (0.6%).
While such a high percentage may be attributed to the selectivity of this sample and
the level of student sophistication about politics, support for democracy in Indonesia
appears to be extremely high by a world-wide comparison (Lagos, 2003). Never-
theless, when asked ‘Have there been negative developments since Indonesia’s
political transition in 1998’, 94% (2.5% nr) of respondents stated that there had
been negative consequences from the transition. The students were then asked to list
two negative developments, and as can be seen in Table 1, 20.1% of the total listed
economic decline as the major negative aspect of the transitional era.

































































Economically, during President Suharto’s reign Indonesia was ranked by the IMF as
one of the world’s top emerging economies based on statistics such as the per capita
GDP rising from $90 in 1968 to more than $1,000 in the mid-1990s (CNN, 1999). As
we know the Asian economic crisis began whilst Suharto was still in power, meaning
that economic decline began prior to the democratic transition in 1998 (Clark, 2001).
Given that the student respondents were aware of this, it seems that they blamed
post-transition leaders for their inability to achieve rapid economic recovery. Thus
any new administration had to cope with disproportionate public expectations and
the political demands that arise from transitional periods, while at the same time
encumbered by the new standards of budgetary accountability demanded at home
and fiscal policy being imposed by institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund and World Bank.
At the end of the questionnaire, students were asked ‘At the present time, what is
the biggest problem in Indonesia?’ and the problem of corruption was answered
23.8% of the time, followed by economic decline at 19.9%. Based on Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index from 2005, Indonesia ranked 140 out of
159 countries surveyed, just ahead of Iraq in terms of its score based on the
perceptions of business people and country analysts, who rated Indonesia as ‘highly
corrupt’ (Lambsdorff, 2006). In a cross-national/multi-state study of governance,
President Suharto received the second highest score on efficiency and yet also one of
the lowest scores on accountability (Hyden et al., 2004). He stands accused of
embezzling billions of dollars through lucrative government contracts, of establishing
complex elite networks, of fostering inter-group hostility, and controlling the press
(MacIntyre, 2001).
During times of crisis Suharto also proved capable of manipulating the political
system and appeasing public opinion. He would intermittently acknowledge the
problem of corruption, and when public pressure was sufficient there would be
dramatic intervention. For instance, in 1985 Suharto disempowered the entire
customs bureau because of waterfront corruption; in 1986 he disbanded the cotton
import monopoly; and in 1996 he publicly humiliated the Ministry of Transport
when corruption became too blatant (MacIntyre, 2001). Currently, President
Yudhoyono has initiated several high-profile anti-corruption campaigns such as
Table 1 Open-Ended Questions about Attitudes towards Transition from Authoritarian
Era to Democracy in Indonesia
Negative developments Biggest current problem Positive developments
20.1% economic decline 23.8% corruption 30.2% free press
19.3% insecurity 19.9% economic decline 27.8% civil liberties
15.6% political instability 13.7% weak political system 17.2% electoral reforms
15.2% social problems 9.8% social problems 15.1% political reforms
15.2% corruption 9.0% crisis in leadership 5.8% greater social tolerance
9.7% weak government leadership 7.2% education 1.8% economic recovery
4.3% weak legal system 6.1% weak legal system 1.1% legal reforms

































































prosecuting the governor of Aceh province along with two others and five members
of the General Elections Commission have been convicted of corruption along with
many lower-ranking officials (Tupai, 2006).
In addition to considering corruption to be biggest problem in Indonesia (Table 1),
97.2% (0.6% nr) of students responded ‘yes’ when asked ‘Do you feel that there is a
‘‘culture of corruption’’ in Indonesia’. This suggests that the students might be
inclined to blame their culture, customs and traditions for the problem of corruption
as opposed to flaws in the political and legal system that often grants immunity/
impunity to the most blatant abusers (Robertson-Snape, 1999). On the other hand,
the ‘culture’ mentioned could refer to an administrative culture of corruption
whereby politicians, businessmen, generals, judges and executives may form intricate
networks of collusion, striking clandestine deals that monopolize wealth and distort
development (Tyson, 2003). Within a culture of corruption people may find
themselves in positions of influence and will quickly learn how to misuse their
authority and avoid the repercussions. Ultimately, the abuse of public office for
private gain threatens the viability of democratic principles and public trust in the
political system. In this survey, the students’ remedy for Indonesia’s ‘culture of
corruption’ was increasing freedom of expression and strengthening democratic
principles such as government accountability and transparency.
Positive attitudes towards democracy were surveyed with two questions. The first
question asked: ‘Overall, have the years since the transition from the New Order era
to democracy in Indonesia brought about positive changes?’ and 68.5% (4.1% nr)
indicated that there were positive changes. When asked ‘Have there been positive
developments since Indonesia’s political transition in 1998’, 71% (0.9% nr) responded
‘yes’. The students responding ‘yes’ were instructed to list two positive developments,
and as seen in Table 1, 30.2% listed free press, 27.8% listed civil liberties, 17.2% listed
electoral reform, and 15.1% listed political reform. It is known that during the New
Order constitutional guarantees for freedom of the press were usurped by the
government, which retained the authority to ban any publication and forced editors
into self-censorship (Robertson-Snape, 1999). In a positive development, the
Information Ministry rescinded the law that allowed it to revoke a newspaper’s
licence for criticizing the government in 1998. Despite some critiques of press
freedoms and pro-democratic reforms, these remain some of the real achievements of
the transitional era.
Transition from Authoritarian Era to Democracy (Hypothesis 2)
One focus of this article is to contrast political science students who are positive and
negative towards the transition to democracy in Indonesia by measuring the
importance they attributed to democratic principles. Importance of democratic
principles was rated on a scale where the number 1 was ‘not important at all’ and
number 5 was ‘of greatest importance/essential’. Of the 13 democratic principles
sampled (Table 2), students rated accountability in government to be of highest

































































importance (M4.87, SD0.42), and rated legitimate, multiparty elections as the
least important (M3.82, SD0.92). The high rating for government accountability
and transparency is consistent with other studies which found strong public
dissatisfaction in these areas (Hyden et al., 2004). Corruption reflects a lack of
accountability and transparency, and in the case of Indonesia this extends from the
highest elected officials and judiciary down to civil servants using their position for
private gain.
In the post-Suharto era, the highly centralized authoritarian regime was in some
ways dismantled, but this failed to produce a quick transition towards free markets or
liberal modes of governance on the same level as in Thailand (Hadiz and Robison,
2005). Observers often assume that by unravelling the state-owned sector this would
shift power to popular interests and liberal democratic institutions which are
accountable, transparent, and promote civil society. Although banking reforms forced
many conglomerates out of import monopolies, many of them managed to move into
domestic trade cartels and public infrastructure projects such as power generation
and telecommunications formerly controlled by the state (Hadiz and Robison, 2005).
As the structures of authoritarian rule withered under pressure from policy initiatives
by the IMF and World Bank, the political and business interests nurtured by the New
Order were in the best position to capitalize on the decentralization of state authority
and political reforms (Tyson, 2005a). The so-called ‘decentralization of corruption’
Table 2 Transition from Authoritarian Era to Democracy: Rating Democratic Principles
from 1‘Not Important at All’ to 5‘Of Greatest Importance/Essential’, with bold
indicating significant difference
Question Positive developments since
political transition in 1998
Positive developments since New








Accountability 4.87 0.13 t2.50, pB0.025 0.07 t1.29, p0.200
Transparency 4.73 0.01 t0.09, p0.929 0.01 t0.06, p0.952
Rule of law 4.70 0.11 t1.58, p0.115 0.08 t1.09, p0.275
Tolerance/
pluralism
4.70 0.11 t1.46, p0.143 0.33 t4.63, pB0.001
Independent
judiciary
4.66 0.10 t1.35, p0.176 0.03 t0.40, p0.687
Human rights 4.61 0.04 t0.57, p0.572 0.17 t2.15, pB0.050
Civil society 4.46 0.06 t0.69, p0.490 0.11 t1.21, p0.229
Representation 4.44 0.28 t3.52, pB0.001 0.25 t3.04, pB0.010
Anti-corruption 4.34 0.15 t1.33, p0.184 0.12 t1.06, p0.292
Gender equality 4.34 0.21 t2.09, pB0.050 0.16 t1.52, p0.129
Constitutional
reform
4.13 0.03 t0.28, p0.778 0.04 t0.38, p0.706
Equal
opportunities
4.06 0.08 t0.07, p0.947 0.12 t0.98, p0.326
Legitimate
elections
3.82 0.59 t5.16, pB0.001 0.35 t2.94, pB0.010

































































occurs as many new actors engage in subversive activities, leaving a deep ambivalence
towards the effectiveness of democratic institutions in Indonesia.8
The second hypothesis focused on the transition from authoritarianism to
democracy and predicted that Indonesian students who were positive towards the
developments since the end of President Suharto’s reign would rate democratic
principles as more important than the 2728% of students who were negative about
the developments. Table 2 examines two questions concerning these positive
developments, and with only a few exceptions, students responding ‘yes’ rated
democratic principles as more important than those responding ‘no’. Statistically
significant differences depended on the wording of the question and may have been
affected by a ceiling effect since many of the ratings of democratic principles were
close to 5, meaning ‘of greatest importance/essential ‘. When the question referred to
the political transition in 1998, the principles of accountability, representation,
gender equality, and legitimate elections were significantly higher among positive
students (Table 2). The significance of representation and legitimate elections was
replicated when questioned about positive developments since the New Order to
democracy and added tolerance/pluralism and human rights as discriminators of
positive and negative students.
Reanalysis of gender differences using more powerful analysis of variance as
expected found the same main effects significant as t-tests in Table 2. Consequently
due to reduced error variance the level of significance increased and some effects
became significant. For example, the significance of gender equality for students
responding to the transition in 1998 moved from pB0.05 using t-tests to a main
effect (F(1,298)5.87, pB0.025) with free and fair elections and main effect
(F(1,298)4.04, pB0.05) with strong leadership in the analysis. The non-significant
t-test, when the question was phrased as the transition from the New Order era, was
significantly different for gender equality with free and fair elections (F(1,289)3.48,
pB0.025) and with strong leadership (F(1,290)8.90, pB0.01).
In light of certain stereotypes about gender relations in the Muslim world, analysis
of gender equality in Indonesia is an important issue, and as expected women rated
(M4.50, SD0.66) it significantly (t(309)4.35, pB0.001) more important
than men (M4.11, SD0.95). Male students rated legitimate elections (t(302)
2.22, pB0.05), independent judiciary (t(308)2.14, pB0.05) and constitutional
reform (t(307)2.04, pB0.05) more important than female university students.
Assumptions that Muslim societies are resistant to gender equality are common, but
the Islamic world is far too diverse to be treated as an undifferentiated whole.
Empirical research has shown that attitudes towards women’s issues, modernization
and democracy are substantially different in the Middle East, Turkey and Indonesia,
in terms of social, economic and political activities (Moghadam, 2005). However, it is
sometimes difficult to reconcile gender equality with current interpretations of
Islamic law (Shari’a), which are often biased against women with regards to family
law and economic independence.

































































The political representation of minority political, ethnic and religious groups was
consistently rated more important by positive students than negative students when
answering both questions referring to the end of three decades under authoritarian
rule (Table 2). The importance of representation or empowerment of minorities was
significantly (t(307)3.52, pB0.001) more important among students who
perceived positive developments since 1998 (M4.53, SD0.59), compared to
students responding ‘no’ (M4.25, SD0.76). Perceived positive changes since the
New Order era were also significant (t(297)3.04, pB0.01) and reinforced the
difference between positive (M4.52, SD0.59) and negative students (M4.27,
SD0.77). It was interesting that legitimate, multiparty elections proved to be the
most significant (t(303)5.16, pB0.001) discriminator of the 71% (0.9% nr) of
students indicating positive developments (M3.99, SD0.82), compared to
students responding ‘no’ (M3.40, SD1.05). In addition, when students were
asked about positive changes since the transition, the significant difference was
replicated (t(214)2.94, pB0.01) which indicates that legitimate elections were
more important among positive students (M3.91, SD0.81) than those
responding negatively (M3.56, SD1.04).
Indonesia’s Reformed 2004 Electoral Process (Hypothesis 3)
After the democratic transition, elections were scheduled for June 1999 and the frenzy
of party politics yielded over a hundred parties, 48 of which were allowed to take part
in the election and 21 achieved representation in parliament (Tan, 2002). Despite the
early euphoria among democratization advocates over the transition from author-
itarian rule, a sense of nostalgia has also been growing among the general public as
well as business and intellectual elites. The pseudo-democratic New Order regime left
an authoritarian legacy transmitted by an elite group with a history of collaboration
with political parties. Even in an extreme multiparty system like that of Indonesia, the
loci of authority only shifted from one small clique without successfully trickling
down to the people (Tyson, 2004). The citizens in the middle and at the bottom of
the social ladder may show less enthusiasm for these liberal democratic principles
unless they translate into substantive socio-economic opportunities or improvements
in livelihoods (Volpi, 2004).
In the 2004 general elections Indonesia’s reformed General Election Committee
(KPU) was responsible for verifying 540,000 legislative candidates, and issuing 150
million voter identity cards (Thalang, 2005). Presidential and vice-presidential
candidates were nominated by coalitions of parties after the legislative elections, and
five pairs attempted to win 50% of the vote which was necessary for victory. In the
second round, incumbent President Megawati formed a coalition of four major
parties and was expected to win. To the surprise of many, presidential candidate
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and vice-presidential candidate Jusuf Kalla won with
60.6% of the popular vote. Yudhoyono graduated from Indonesia’s military academy
in 1973 and retired from the military as a four-star general in 2000 to join the Wahid

































































government as Minister for Mines, and later Chief Minister for Security and Political
Affairs. He was also President Megawati’s Security Minister before resigning to form
the Democratic Party which only got 7.45% of the vote in the legislative election
(Qodari, 2005). His running mate, Jusuf Kalla, is head of the Golkar Party and enjoys
much support in Eastern Indonesia given that he was born in Sulawesi. People’s
satisfaction with the government measured by the Indonesian Survey Institute peaked
at 80% shortly after the inauguration, although it has been steadily dropping,
especially in terms of economic growth and unemployment (Qodari, 2005).
In this study the difference between students optimistic about the 2004 elections
and those pessimistic about the elections on the surface appears insignificant.
Although legitimate elections were considered the least important principle by
students, most scholars base their definition of democracy on the holding of
contested elections that are authentically free and fair (Mayer, 2001). The present
study queried students’ election opinions by asking whether they were ‘Optimistic
that the general elections will be both free and fair’, and whether they were
‘Optimistic that the general elections will bring about strong and effective leadership’.
The majority of political science students responded ‘no’ to questions about their
optimism towards the 2004 general elections, 58.7% (2.8% nr) were not optimistic
about the elections being free and fair, and 70.7% (2.8% nr) were pessimistic about
electing strong and effective leadership.
The third hypothesis focused on the 2004 general elections and predicted that
optimistic students who feel that the pro-democratic reforms since 1999 will result in
the election of strong leaders, and that the elections will be free and fair, will rate
democratic principles as more important than the majority of students pessimistic
towards the elections. As seen in Table 3 the general positive differences between ‘yes’
and ‘no’ in most cases supported the hypothesis, but none of the democratic
principles were found to significantly discriminate between optimistic and pessimistic
students. Even the democratic principle of legitimate elections which, as expected,
had the largest differences was not a significant discriminator between students either
for elections being free and fair or electing strong and effective leaders.
The pessimistic mood of the majority of politics students was reflected in the
results of the 2004 elections, especially in terms of leadership. A national survey in
2003 showed a substantial decline in the perceived trustworthiness of all major
political parties and a decline in voter support in the parliamentary elections. For
example, incumbent President Megawati’s PDI-P party dropped in trust from 72% in
2002 to 50% in 2003, and the percentage of voter support for the party declined from
33.7% in the 1999 election to 18.5% in 2004 (Vaughn, 2005). The Golkar Party,
strongly associated with Suharto’s authoritarian regime, remained a potent political
force after the 1999 election with 22.5% of the popular vote, and only declined
slightly to 21.6% of the 2004 legislative vote. Golkar also declined in terms of
trustworthiness, though only slightly, from 50% down to 48% in 2003 (Vaughn,
2005). The multiparty structure in Indonesia suggests a high level of volatility derived
from a lack of stable party foundations in terms of policy, organization, funding and

































































constituency. Despite predictions that strife would mar the 2004 elections, there was
only isolated violence associated with either presidential or legislative elections and
most external agencies considered them relatively free and fair.
Cognitive Consistency between Transition and Elections (Hypothesis 4)
The fourth hypothesis focused on comparing students’ evaluation of democratic
principles, particularly among those that were consistently positive or negative
towards the transition in 1998, and their predictions about the 2004 general elections
in terms of selecting strong leaders and being free and fair. When cognitive theory
probes political attitudes, at the core is a hypothesized mechanism that determines
the consistency of the query with past memories, beliefs, or opinions. If these factors
are congruent, then people quickly and efficiently process the information and
respond to the question (Zaller and Feldman, 1992). Individuals differ considerably
in the degree of consistency they expect in life and from politicians or parties.
Political science students who were positive towards the democratic transition and
optimistic towards the elections were expected to rate democratic principles as more
important than students negative about the transition and pessimistic towards the
2004 general elections. There were four combinations of ‘yes/yes’ and ‘no/no’
Table 3 Indonesia’s Reformed 2004 Electoral Process: Rating Democratic Principles from
1‘Not Important at All’ to 5‘Of Greatest Importance/Essential’
Question Optimistic that the general
elections both free and fair
Optimistic that the general











Accountability 4.87 0.08 t1.57, p0.117 0.01 t0.13, p0.896
Transparency 4.73 0.03 t0.56, p0.580 0.02 t0.23, p0.820
Rule of law 4.70 0.03 t0.50, p0.619 0.06 t0.91, p0.367
Tolerance/
pluralism
4.70 0.02 t0.28, p0.782 0.01 t0.14, p0.887
Independent
judiciary
4.66 0.06 t0.92, p0.357 0.05 t0.64, p0.524
Human rights 4.61 0.04 t0.64, p0.525 0.02 t0.31, p0.760
Civil society 4.46 0.11 t1.34, p0.181 0.09 t0.96, p0.336
Representation 4.44 0.05 t0.58, p0.560 0.04 t0.42, p0.674
Anti-corruption 4.34 0.06 t0.58, p0.564 0.04 t0.35, p0.727
Gender equality 4.34 0.03 t0.24, p0.812 0.06 t0.55, p0.583
Constitutional
reform
4.13 0.01 t0.14, p0.778 0.01 t0.07, p0.941
Equal
opportunities
4.06 0.17 t1.62, p0.106 0.01 t0.12, p0.904
Legitimate
elections
3.82 0.17 t1.60, p0.111 0.18 t1.51, p0.132

































































responses derived from two questions focusing on the transition and two questions
referring to the general elections. Analysis of these two groups of students revealed a
pattern of results very similar to the students who were positive or negative towards
the transition from authoritarianism (Table 2).
Of the 52 possible combinations of questions, all but four were in the predicted
direction where democratic principles were rated more important by students
positive about the transition to democracy and optimistic about the elections. In
contrast, students consistently pessimistic about leadership in the elections and the
democratic transition rated the importance of government transparency slightly more
important when referring to the transition in 1998 (M(yes)4.72; M(no)4.73)
and since New Order era (M(yes)4.70; M(no)4.71). Constitutional reform since
the New Order era was considered more important by negative students related to
free and fair elections (M(yes)4.08; M(no)4.11) and strong and effective
leadership (M(yes)4.13; M(no) 4.18). Although these differences are not
statistically significant, constitutional reform has been a persistent issue during
elections in Indonesia, especially among parties promoting Islamic traditions (Tan,
2002). Given that more than 80% of Indonesians are Muslim, secular parties cannot
succeed if they appear to be opposing Islamic principles; however, constitutional
reforms designed to require all Muslims to live by Islamic laws, civil and criminal,
would challenge Indonesia’s secular state and its long standing espousal of Pancasila
(von der Mehden, 2005).9
As seen in Table 4 the most significant difference between consistently positive and
negative students centres on the importance of legitimate elections. Instead of
expecting that democratic elections will rescue Indonesia from its problems,
pessimistic students point with nostalgia to the New Order era where social order
and economic growth was achieved by limiting political freedoms (Emmerson, 2004).
Government accountability, although considered extremely important, was rated
significantly less important by consistently negative students compared to positive
students. Optimistic students’ emphasis on electoral representation and empower-
ment of minority groups through free and fair elections significantly distinguished
Table 4 Consistency between Authoritarian Transition and 2004 General Elections, with
bold indicating significant difference
Question Positive developments since political
transition in 1998
Positive developments since New
Order era to democracy








Accountability 0.185, pB0.01 0.123, p0.063 0.120, p0.60 0.064, p0.404
Tolerance/
pluralism
0.073, p0.413 0.103, p0.253 0.240, pB0.025 0.269, pB0.01
Representation 0.259, pB0.025 0.206, p0.063 0.211, pB0.05 0.180, p123
Legitimate
elections
0.706, pB0.001 0.695, pB0.001 0.390, pB0.01 0.469, pB0.01

































































them from students negative about the transition from authoritarian rule and
elections (Table 4). The negative views towards the reform era and pessimism about
the election led students to undervalue the importance of tolerance towards ethnic
minorities and religious groups in contrast to consistently positive students.
Cognitive Dissonance between Transition and Elections (Hypothesis 5)
As we have seen, students consistently negative generally consider democratic
principles less important than consistently positive students, however, in 46% of
cases a group of ambivalent students rated democratic principles even less important
than consistently negative students. As predicted by cognitive dissonance theory
(Festinger, 1957), ambivalent students who were nostalgic for Suharto’s authoritarian
era but optimistic about the democratic elections resolved their discrepancy by
reducing the importance of specific democratic principles. Five democratic principles
were the most significant (Table 5) and new to the list is the importance of the
government’s anti-corruption campaign.
The most prominent factor that seems to influence people’s perceptions towards
both strong and effective leadership as well as free and fair elections in Indonesia is
corruption. The importance of anti-corruption campaigns was rated highest among
consistently positive students and lowest by ambivalent students who were negative
about the transition to democracy (Table 5). Although these ambivalent students
rated democratic principles the lowest in importance in all cases, the difference
related to free and fair elections were statistically the most significant and post hoc
comparisons indicated by asterisks shows which groups were significantly different
from these ambivalent students, highlighted in bold.
Granted all students felt that corruption was a very important problem in
Indonesia, there are several different interpretations of why ambivalence would have
more extreme ratings than consistency. If the student is a member of an elite group
that benefited from corruption during the authoritarian period, it would be
reasonable to undervalue anti-corruption efforts especially when the elections might
provide an opportunity to reinstate the elite group’s influence (Webber, 2006).
Another interpretation of reducing the salience of anti-corruption campaigns is due
to disillusionment with past governments’ efforts to eliminate indigenous corruption
by superficial propaganda and show trials that do not address the causes of
corruption frequently attributed to capitalism and Western ideas of competitive
democracy (Voll, 2005).
Beyond the rationale for anti-corruption campaigns, ambiguous students also
rated many other democratic principles such as tolerance, representation, gender
equality and accountability as less important than students consistently positive or
negative about the transition to democracy and elections (Table 6). Post hoc analyses
showed which groups indicated by asterisk were significantly different from this
ambivalent group highlighted in bold and a similar pattern can be seen related to
selecting strong effective leaders and elections being free and fair. After a major

































































political event such as the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, the
question is how do the university students in this study adjust their attitudes and
beliefs to the new socio-economic system? In particular, what are the consistently
negative and ambivalent students’ rationalizations and justifications for changes in
the status quo after three decades of authoritarianism? The results identify a tendency
for negative students to marginalize the importance of tolerance and political
representation for disadvantaged minority groups as well as gender inequality,
especially among ambivalent students who were anticipating a favourable outcome
from the 2004 general elections.
The function of political ideology is to provide people with the illusion of order
and justice in the world. Both victims and beneficiaries of a post-authoritarian regime
have a need to justify the dissonance created by their beliefs and their present
situation. Psychological theory debates whether the origin of the dissonance is related
to an individual’s need for self-consistency or a need to remain consistent in their
Table 5 Cognitive Dissonance between Authoritarian Transition and 2004 General
Elections for Corruption and Tolerance for Minorities
Question Yes No Significance
Importance of anti-corruption campaign
2004 elections will be free and fair
Positive changes since Yes 4.46* 4.27 F(1,288)6.71
New Order era to democracy No 3.83 4.35* pB0.01
2004 elections will bring strong and effective leadership
Positive changes since Yes 4.42 4.34 F(1,288)2.07
New Order era to democracy No 3.91 4.30 p0.151
2004 elections will be free and fair
Positive developments since Yes 4.50* 4.26 F(1,297)7.65
political transition in 1998 No 3.93 4.37* pB0.01
2004 elections will bring strong and effective leadership
Positive developments since Yes 4.47* 4.33 F(1,297)2.97
political transition in 1998 No 3.94 4.30 p0.086
Importance of tolerance/pluralism (minorities, religion, ethnic)
2004 elections will be free and fair
Positive changes since Yes 4.78* 4.78* F(1,292)5.80
New Order era to democracy No 4.15 4.54* pB0.025
2004 elections will bring strong and effective leadership
Positive changes since Yes 4.81* 4.77* F(1,293)9.98
New Order era to democracy No 4.00 4.54* pB0.01
2004 elections will be free and fair
Positive changes since Yes 4.72 4.72 F(1,301)0.629
political transition in 1998 No 4.54 4.65 p0.428
2004 elections will bring strong and effective leadership
Positive changes since Yes 4.76* 4.71* F(1,301)3.57
political transition in 1998 No 4.38 4.66 p0.060
*Group of students that were significantly different from the ambivalent students (highlighted in bold).

































































social network and group identifications (Jost and Hunyady, 2002). Psychological
discussions of politics have been criticized for committing the attribution error of
assuming the source of attitudes is within the person. Multicultural research has
found that in individualistic cultures, personal attitudes are correlated with
personality and other intra-individual variables whereas in collectivist cultures they
are more affected by social group and external variables (Hall and Barongan, 2002).
Similarly, when people experience cognitive dissonance they are assumed to change
their attitudes or preferences to be consistent internally. However, in societies such as
Indonesia which place greater emphasis on social identification and consensus, the
individual may define self-esteem in terms of harmony with others and will sacrifice
self-interest to maintain ideological consistency (Fiske, 2004). The political question
Table 6 Cognitive Dissonance between Authoritarian Transition and 2004 General
Elections for Representation, Gender Equality, and Accountability
Question Yes No Significance
Importance of representation/empowerment
2004 elections will be free and fair
Positive changes since Yes 4.55* 4.47* F(1,288)7.45
New Order era to democracy No 3.89 4.34* pB0.01
2004 elections will bring strong and effective leadership
Positive changes since Yes 4.48* 4.53* F(1,289)2.39
New Order era to democracy No 4.00 4.30 p0.291
2004 elections will be free and fair
Positive changes since Yes 4.58* 4.48* F(1,297)3.93
political transition in 1998 No 4.07 4.32 pB0.05
2004 elections will bring strong and effective leadership
Positive developments since Yes 4.53* 4.53* F(1,297)3.76
political transition in 1998 No 3.94 4.32* p0.053
Importance of gender equality
2004 elections will be free and fair
Positive changes since Yes 4.38* 4.36* F(1,289)2.95
New Order era to democracy No 3.89 4.29 p0.087
2004 elections will bring strong and effective leadership
Positive changes since Yes 4.49* 4.32* F(1,290)8.21
New Order era to democracy No 3.67 4.30* pB0.01
2004 elections will be free and fair
Positive changes since Yes 4.41* 4.37* F(1,298)1.72
political transition in 1998 No 4.00 4.25 p0.191
2004 elections will bring strong and effective leadership
Positive developments since Yes 4.43 4.38 F(1,298)0.15
political transition in 1998 No 4.13 4.17 p0.702
Importance of accountability in government
2004 elections will bring strong and effective leadership
Positive developments since Yes 4.94* 4.89* F(1,298)5.66
political transition in 1998 No 4.56 4.82* pB0.025

































































is whether people are driven by the desire to preserve a positive self-image when
confronted by conflicts or whether social pressures cause them to defend the image of
the group or ideology even if this comes at the expense of the self-image or self-
preservation.
Conclusion
In open-ended questions, political science students identified economic decline as
one of the biggest current problems in Indonesia and negative consequences of
converting from an authoritarian regime to democracy. Some students who were
negative about the transition from an authoritarian era, presumably threatening their
status or economic networks, responded by lowering the importance of democratic
principles, particularly with regards to the legitimacy of elections and participation of
groups outside of their immediate sphere. In Indonesian culture, where values such as
cooperation, consensus, deliberation (musyawarah) and concern for the common
good tend to be associated, these political science students seem to have a conflict
between indigenous values and modern individualistic models of democracy and
competitive economics (Bowen, 1986).
The detailed profile of this small group of nostalgic students reveals that issues
such as gender equality, accountability, anti-corruption initiatives and legitimate
elections are viewed as significantly less important when compared with the majority
of Indonesian students. The dissonant students are optimistic that elections will
provide strong leadership and economic prosperity, similar in many ways to the past
authoritarian era which excluded minorities, reduced government accountability and
restricted democratic freedoms. The ambivalent students who had a negative reaction
to the post-authoritarian era in Indonesia may have seen democratic elections as a
means to protect their economic self-interest or as a way to empower an ideological
group, whether based on religion, ethnicity, or elitism.
Consequently, the Indonesian democratic initiatives that accompanied the
extensive political upheaval from authoritarian rule and struggle for systemic
modernization must draw upon the cooperation of diverse groups to maintain a
unified country. It is often assumed that reforms at the national level set the tone for
changes locally, throughout the archipelago, although it has often been found that
local initiatives are in fact more progressive or at least responsive to the demands of
the local population (Tyson, 2005a). What needs to be considered in future research
is how the nostalgia for the New Order and its mechanisms for maintaining central
authoritarian rule impact the current decentralization process in Indonesia whereby
regional, district and local actors are increasingly empowered and engaged in the
political process. The new generation of Indonesian students is not unified in their
perceptions of history or importance of democratic institutions and thus it is
important to understand their opinions and attitudes during this transitional stage in
political development.


































































[1] Facing mounting political pressure and rising public discontent, Sukarno adopted what he
called a system of ‘guided democracy’ in an attempt to preserve his authority.
[2] The communist purges swept throughout Indonesia, with concentrations of violence in Java
and Bali, leading to estimates of up to 500,000 fatalities (of suspected or real communists)
over a period of one year.
[3] Prior to these elections, J. B. Habibie served as caretaker president. He was a close associate of
Suharto, although he did push for reforms and in some aspects embraced the spirit of
democracy.
[4] Although the focus was on Jakarta, on 11 May 1998 Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta,
Central Java, was host to the largest student demonstration the country had seen for 20 years
(McRae, 1999).
[5] Interview with faculty member from Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, on 2
March 2004.
[6] Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono approved the lifting of subsidies on refined petroleum products
commonly referred to as Bahan Bakar Minyak (BBM) leading to substantial price increases
and public outcry (Tyson, 2005b). Previous leaders have also tried to push ahead with this
reform, but buckled under public and political pressure. SBY’s ‘Bitter Pill’ speech
acknowledged the short-term difficulties this new policy would cause, but also appealed
to the public to accept such changes as in the long-term national interest. He also introduced
a compensation policy for poor families across the archipelago, which resembles the makings
of a welfare system.
[7] These were the University of Indonesia, Depok; Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung;
and Gajah Mada University, Jogyakarta.
[8] In ‘A Better Class of Corruption’, Ross H. McLeod (2000) raises some interesting
comparisons between systems of centralized and managed corruption versus decentralized
and uncontrolled systems of corruption.
[9] When Indonesia was struggling to define itself during the period of independence there were
competing forces, some advocating Islamic principles as enshrined in the Jakarta Charter,
and others advocating the secular principles of Pancasila. The latter won the debate, although
there are groups in Indonesia that have yet to abandon the goal of institutionalizing Islamic
law and principles in Indonesia. In Java, distinctions have been made between Muslims
categorized as traditionalist and orthodox (santri) and those known to be more syncretic
(abangan), blending indigenous customs with religion (Geertz, 1960).
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